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1977 NORTH DAKOTA
SUPREME COURT REVIEW*
This is a review of important North Dakota Supreme Court deci-
sions handed down by the court during 1977. The purpose of this re-
view is to serve as a convenient overview of important decisions and,
in some cases, a summary of the effect that these decisions will have
on North Dakota law.
Not all 1977 decisions are discussed, but only those which are felt
will have the greatest impact on North Dakota law.
The review is divided alphabetically by subject area, including
the following subjects:
Contracts .............................................................................................. 635
Crim inal Law and Procedure ........................................................ 637
Evidence .............................................................................................. 644
Governm ent ........................................................................................ 647
Insurance ........................................ 649
Parent-Child ........................................................................................ 652
Professional Responsibility-Attorneys .................................... 654
Taxation .............................................................................................. 656
T orts ...................................................................................................... 658
Uniform Com m ercial Code ............................................................ 663
W ills and T rusts .............................................................................. 667
CONTRACTS
In its unanimous opinion of August 18, 1977, the North Dakota
Supreme Court, in Amann v. Frederick,1 held that specific perform-
* This project was prepared by the following members of the staff of the North Dakota
Law Review; Scott E. Boehm, Michael A. Campbell, Steven L. Marquart, Patrick J. Ward,
and Terry L. Wiles.
1. 257 N.V.2d 436 (N.D. 1977).
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ance of an option to convey 400 acres of land was warranted despite
the contention that one party could not read and his wife did not read
various papers they signed.2 The parties entered into a series of agree-
ments whereby the plaintiffs covenanted to lease 400 acres of farm
land from the defendant for five years, together with an option to pur-
chase the 400 acres within that period.3 The plaintiff exercised his
contractual option in writing but the defendants refused to convey the
land on the grounds that there was no "meeting of the minds" nor
consideration for the option contract.4
Speaking for the court, Mr. Justice Vogel stated that, even though
the defendants argued that they were not aware of the contents of the
lease-option agreement, there was more than adequate evidence be-
fore the Dunn County District court judge to justify the conclusion that
the contract was based upon mutual assent. 5 If mutual assent is in
some way evidenced, the contract will be binding regardless of men-
tal reservations or misunderstandings by one or both parties, in the
absence of fraud or other recognized grounds for setting aside the con-
tract.6
As to the claim that there was no consideration for the option, the
court found that a separate instrument is not required to express con-
sideration for an option agreement.7 The fact that the parties included
an orally discussed option fee in the total yearly rental amount was
sufficient consideration for a valid option."
The defendant finally asserted that they were at least entitled to
the agreed upon rental value for the fifth year of the contract, despite
the fact that the plaintiffs exercised their option during the fourth
year of the contract.9 The court correctly found that when the optionee
exercised his option he then became the owner of the real estate and
was thereafter entitled to collect the rent on the property. 10 Therefore,
any obligation the plaintiff had to pay rent was to himself."
In Bottineau Public School District No. 1 v. Currie,12 the North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed a Ward County District Court ruling
which held a former Bottineau School teacher liable for breach of con-
tract in the amount of $500 liquidated damages.' s
Pursuant to the law of North Dakota the Bottineau School Board
is required to notify teachers within the district whether it intends to
2. Amann v. Frederick, 257 N.WV.2d 436, 438 (N.D. 1977).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 438-39.
5. Id. at 439.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 441.
10. N.D. CENT. CODE ! 47-04-26 (1978).
11. 257 N.W.2d at 441.
12. 259 N..W.2d 650 (N.D. 1977).
1,3. Bottineau Pub. School Dist. No. 1 v. Currie. 2.9 N.-'.2d 650, 650 (N.D. 1977).
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renew their contracts for the next year. 14 In 1976, however, negotia-
tions were still in progress between the teachers and the School Board
and the latter sent teachers a timely notice that they intended to re-
new the contracts on the same basis as the prior years except as were
modified by the continuing negotiations.' 5 Accompanying the notice
was a blank response form requesting that the teachers either accept
or reject the offer. Instead of responding on the form supplied to
them, the teachers answered on their own prepared forms indicating
whether they had an intention to return to the Bottineau Public
Schools. 8 The defendant returned her response to the School Board
with the "it is my intent to [return]" blank checked. 1 7 Several months
later, the defendant resigned her position' and the School Board in-
stituted this action to collect liquidated costs of replacement. 9
In reversing, the supreme court held that no binding contract
existed between the parties. 20 The notification to the School Board by
the defendant that she intended to return the following year was
merely an expression of a future intention, and not a contractual ac-
ceptance.21 "A mere statement of an intention to act in a certain way
is not a promise upon which a contract can be predicated. '2 2
The court took great care not to fault the School Board for the
problem in this case, 2 and placed the blame rather on the statutory
provisions by which the Board was guided.2 4 The court emphasized
a "dire need for legislation delineating and making appropriate ad-
justments between the two statutes. '25
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
14. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-27 (1971).
15. 259 N.W.2d at 651.
16. Id. at 652.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. The 1975-76 contract between the School Board and the defendant provided in part:
"9". Because it is impractical or extremely difficult to fix the actual cost
to be incurred at the time of the release request, the parties, hereto, agree
that the amount presumed to be the cost of replacement shall be fixed as
follows:
Time of Release Request Cost
of Replacement
Within the first 3 days after contract due date $100
Between 3 days after the contract due date prior to end of
present school term 250
Between end of present school term to the termination date of
this contract 500
Nothing stated herein shall be construed as meaning that the Board must
release the teacher upon payment of the above determined costs. The fee
may be waived by the Board if the teacher's resignation is due to Ill health,
military service, or a hardship case."
Id. at 650-51.
20. Id. at 654.
21. Id.
22. Id., quoting Hayashl v. Thringer, 79 N.D. 625, 631, 58 N.W.2d 788, 791 (1953).
23. Id.
24. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-27 (1971) ; Id. ch. 15-38.1 (1971).
25. 259 N.W.2d at 655.
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The supreme court decided some controversial cases involving
constitutional law issues in criminal cases. Two of these involved
prisoners' rights.
In Havener v. Glaser,"2 the court issued a supervisory writ va-
cating the district court's writ of habeas corpus. Two prisoners,
Richard Collins and Michael Schroeder, were placed in administra-
tive isolation at the North Dakota State Penitentiary after allegedly
being found in possession of marijuana within the confines of the peni-
tentiary.2 7 The matter came before the district court on a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. Gerald G. Glaser, judge of the fourth judicial
district, issued the writ. Joseph Havener, warden of the state peni-
tentiary, sought a supervisory writ staying the order of the district
court.
28
The two prisoners alleged in their habeas petition that the pur-
pose for their administrative isolation was punitive 29 and that they
had not been afforded procedural due process. The district court con-
cluded that administrative isolation involves "loss of privileges nor-
mally afforded inmates, together with greater restrictions on freedom
of movement and communication. "30
The supreme court found that the purpose for segregating Collins
and Schroeder was security and not punishment. The court noted the
fact that the two prisoners were suspected of "trafficking in narcotics
and that this was a serious problem at the penitentiary." 31
The court distinguished Kelly v. Brewer,32 a case in which admin-
istrative segregation at the Iowa State Penitentiary was found to be a
denial of due process. In Kelly the conditions of confinement were
abominable 3 3 as contrasted with the less harsh conditions under the
North Dakota administrative isolation procedure.
The court indicated that judicial intrusion into prison administra-
tion should be avoided, stating that "the administration of a peniten-
tiary is a singular responsibility, many aspects of which are com-
pletely outside the experience of a layman, an attorney, or a judge.
For this reason, even well-intentioned judicial intervention into the
workings of a prison could create problems. ' '3 4
26. 251 N.V.2d 753 (N.D. 1977).
27. Havener v. Glaser, 251 N.W.2d 753, 754 (N.D. 1977).
28. In North Dakota there Is no appeal from a decision in a habeas corpus proceeding
but the Supreme Court can exercise Its superintending control where the issuance of the
writ is predicated upon an error of law. Id. at 757; State ex rel. City of Bismarck v
District Ct., 64 N.D. 399, 253 N.W. 744 (1934).
29. The administrative Isolation unit was established to create "more secure housing
and control of inmates . . . who are frequently disruptive of good order or security." It
is "not to be used as a place of confinement as a punishment for violation of institutional
rules." North Dakota State Penitentiary Adminfistrative Regulations § 505 (as amended
February 27, 1976) (emphasis in original).
30. 251 N.W.2d at 757.
31. Id. at 760.
32. 52 5 F.2d 394 (Sth Cir. 1975).
33. Kelly v. Brewer, 378 F. Supp. 447 (S.D. Ia. 1974).
34. 251 N.W.2d at 759.
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The court concluded that the privileges35 which Collins and Schroe-
der had been denied do not involve the protection of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
but held that the reasons for holding the prisoners in administrative
isolation should be more specifically explained in writing unless to do
so would constitute a serious risk to the security of the institution.3 6
In State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 37 the court was confronted with
the issue of whether the Director of Institutions has the authority to
transfer prisoners, particularly female prisoners, out of the state. The
court held that a prisoner cannot be imprisoned outside of the state
"unless and until a due-process hearing has been held or waived and
an order entered permitting the transfer. ' 38
Initially, the action was brought by the Attorney General to obtain
a supervisory writ requiring the district court to delete the words "and
at no other place" from a judgment sentencing a female prisoner to
eighteen months incarceration in the state penitentiary. One of the
questions presented was whether the trial judge had authority to
specify the place of confinement of convicted prisoners sentenced to
imprisonment or whether that authority belonged to the director of
institutions. The court held that in North Dakota, "it is the [trial]
court . . .which specifies in the first instance the place of confine-
ment .... ,,s The court indicated that several statutes give the director
of institutions authority to change the place of confinement once the
serving of the sentence has begun. 40
The court then turned to the constitutional issues of procedural
due process and equal protection under the law. The court cited Have-
ner v. Glaser- for the proposition that "the extent to which procedural
due process must be afforded depends upon the circumstances of each
case and the nature of the loss involved. ' ' 42 An administrative transfer
requires a due process hearing where it would amount to a "grievous
loss" to the prisoner. 43 Some of the enumerated losses to the prisoner
resulting from out-of-state incarceration were lack of contact with
friends and family, inability to consult with attorneys, and absence
from parole hearings which might effect the determination by the
parole board. 4 Although these factors alone do not create constitu-
tional barriers to administrative transfer when coupled with classifi-
cation by sex, a due process hearing is required.
35. The privileges lost by administrative isolation include institutional employment,
opportunities for education, visitation, and exercise. Id. at 757.
36. Id. at 761.
37. 259 N. W.2d 621 (N.D. 1977).
38. State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 624 (N.D. 1977).
39. Id. at 625.
40. Id. at 626.
41. 251 N.W .2d 753 (N.D. 1977),
42. 259 N.W.2d at 627.
43. Id., citing Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537, 539-41 (Ist Cir. 1974).
44. 259 N.V.2d at 631.
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The court found that under the North Dakota Constitution 45 sex is
an inherently suspect classification 46 requiring strict judicial scrutiny.
Under a strict scrutiny standard of review, mere 'administrative con-
venience4 7 will not justify out-of-state imprisonment of female offen-
ders without minimal due process.4 8
The statute in question' could not be found unconstitutional be-
cause only three judges concurred in the majority opinion.50 The dis-
sent, 51 although it indicated agreement with the philosophical concepts
enunciated in the majority opinion, felt that the constitutional issues
were not properly before the court. 52 The dissent points out that Cora
Kroeplin, the defendant in the criminal action, had been used as a
mere pawn to reach a constitutional question which was not raised by
her even though she was the party affected.5 3 The fear that courts
will be "preoccupied with self-styled constitutional questions" brought
by judicial officers acting "sua sponte" is a valid one.5 4
The conclusion which can be drawn from the two prison cases is
that some minimal amount of due process is required even in the case
of non-disciplinary administrative transfers within the prison system.
Another major area in which constitutional issues were decided
in criminal cases is search and seizure. In State v. Lange,5" the de-
fendant was stopped by a Jamestown police officer who had been
alerted of a possible DWI.54 The officer did not stop the car until he
had followed it for five blocks and observed it weaving in its lane of
traffic. As he was waiting for the driver to produce identification, the
officer observed a small pipe in the ashtray and empty brown paper
bags of the type used by liquor stores. He advised the driver of his
Miranda rights and asked if he had been drinking. The driver, Lange,
replied that he had consumed about half of a bottle of wine.
Lange and the passenger, Grager, were taken to the police sta-
45. N.D. CONST. § 20.
46. 259 N.W.2d at 627 ; Bingert v. Bingert, 247 N.W.2d) 464 (N.D. 1976) ; Tang v. Ping.
209 N.W.2d 624 (N.D. 1973).
47. The attorney general argued that the state penitentiary was not equipped to provide
female prisoners with the same educational benefit and opiortunities for rehabilitation.
Due to lack of funding, female prisoners would have to he held in protective custody type
isolation. 259 N.V.2d at 631.
48. Id. at 627.
49. N.D. CENT. CODE & 54-21-25 (1974) states that "[i]f the director of institutions de-
termines that suitable state facilities or services are not available for inmates under his
control he may contract for same with the proper authorities of the United States, another
state, another agency in this state or a political subdivision of this state."
50. N.D. CONST. § 88. This is the reason that the majority' was forced to decide the
case on due process grounds. 259 N.W.2d at 629.
51. The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Sand and concurred in by Justice
Paulson.
52. 259 N.W.2d at 633.
53. Id. at 634.
54. Id. at 635.
55. 255 N.W.2d 59 (N.D. 1977).
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-61 (SUpp.. 1977) which states in pertinent part as follows:
"No person shall drive or be in physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon
public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this
slate if . . . (b) he is tinder the Influence of intoxicating liquor: .... "
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tion. Their car was left locked but unattended. Lange admitted that
there was a half a bottle of wine under the seat and consented to a
search of the vehicle. However, when informed of the proposed thor-
ough nature of the search the defendants hesitated. They were told
that the vehicle could be impounded 'and searched anyway, so they
again consented to the search. The search resulted in the discovery of
lysergic acid diethylamide 57 and the charge was changed to possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. 58
The first issue the court considered was whether the defendant
was stopped and arrested and his vehicle searched without probable
cause. The court said that the police officer, acting upon a radio mes-
sage and his own observations of erratic driving behavior, 'had reason-
able cause to stop the vehicle. 59 The court 'also found probable cause
to make the arrest based upon the officers observation of the pipe and
brown paper bags, his detection of the odor of alcohol, and the admis-
sion by the defendant."
The court then discussed the issue of the voluntariness of the
search. "Voluntariness is a question to be determined from all cir-
cumstances, whether the subject is, or is not, in custody. The circum-
stances should be viewed as more suspect when the subject is in cus-
tody." 6' 1 The court found that the threat to search the vehicle in the
absence of consent was not "inherently coercive" and concluded that
consent was freely and voluntarily obtained.
The court then turned to the chain of custody problem and con-
cluded that "it was proper for the lower court to conclude that the
chain of custody was not broken during the 35 to 45 minute period
when the defendant's vehicle containing the controlled substance was
left locked, but unattended." 62 Mere speculation that the vehicle could
have been broken into, in the absence of any such evidence, is not
enough to justify suppression of the evidence.6 3
In State v. Meadows,6" Cel Novak, Stutsman County Deputy Sher-
iff, observed the defendant, Meadows, drinking a bottle of beer while
driving his car. Novak followed Meadows to a truck stop where Mea-
dows left the car and went inside. Novak pulled alongside of Meadows'
vehicle and observed a six pack of beer with one bottle missing. He
also observed an open bottle of beer on the floor. He attempted to lo-
57. Commonly known as "LSD" or "acid." LSD is a controlled substance under N.D.
CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-05(4) (L) (Supp. 1977).
58. A violation under N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(1) (Supp. 1977) which states in
pertinent part as follows, "... [1It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver,
or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance .
59. State v. Lange, 255 N.W.2d 59, 63 (N.D. 1977).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 64.
62. Id. at 65.
63. Id.
64. 260 N.W.2d 328 (N.D. 1977).
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cate Meadows but was unsuccessful. He then made a warrantless
search of the vehicle seizing the open bottle of beer and the five un-
opened bottles remaining in the six-pack. He continued to search for
more alcoholic beverages and discovered a pistol in the console. Mea-
dows was charged with carrying a pistol in a motor vehicle without
a permit 5 and cited for violation of the North Dakota open bottle
law.66 Meadows moved to suppress the use of the pistol as evidence.
In determining that the search was permissible, the court used a
two prong approach: "(1) the officer must have probable cause to
believe that seizable items are located in the place to be searched;
and (2) the circumstances must bring the search within one of the
exceptions to the rule that a search must be based upon a valid search
warrant.' '67
The parties agreed that Novak had a right to seize the beer which
was in plain view. The question was whether Novak could continue
to search for additional open receptacles of alcohol. The court found
that Novak's belief that Meadows' vehicle contained more open re-
ceptacles of alcohol was not unreasonable.68 "The reasonableness of
Novak's belief ... should be judged in light of the practical and factual
considerations law enforcement personnel are called to act upon in
their myriad of duties." 69
The court then turned to the second question; whether a warrant-
less search was justified. A warrantless search of an automobile is
justified only where there are exigent circumstances, in addition to
probable cause, which require immediate action.7 0 The court felt that
the circumstances 71 were such that there was a "distinct likelihood
that the vehicle or the seizable items therein would have been moved"
had the officer taken the time to obtain a search warrant. 72
Meadows argued that because Novak had already seized sufficient
65. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62-01-05 (1960).
66. Id. § 39-08-18 (Supp. 1977).
67. State .v. Meadows, 260 N.W.2d 328, 330 (N.D. 1977).
68. Id.
69. Id. The court enumerated the following circumstances which contributed to Novak's
belief:
(1) Novak had observed Meadows drinking beer while driving the vehicle:
(2) there was an open bottle of beer and a, partially opened six-pack of
beer in the vehicle; (3) there was an odor of alcohol In the vehicle; and
(4) Novak's prior experience was that most of the time a party consuming
alcoholic beverages on a highway also has more alcohol concealed In the
vehicle.
Id. It should be noted that the first three items are only justifications for the seizure of
the items in plain view. It could be argued that the finding of probable cause for the
extended search wa really based on item (4), Novak's assumption that he would find
more alcoholic beverages in the vehicle.
70. Id. at 332, citing State v. Gagnon,, 207 N.W.2d 260, 264 (N.D. 1973).
71. The court listed five circumstances: (1) Novak observed Meadows drinking while
driving: (2) Novak knew Aeadows was in the immediate area; (3) Meadows' mother
and other persons in the buildinz- knew Novak was looking for Meadows: (4) the vehicle
was on property freely accessible to the public: and (5) the vehicle was unlocked making
the interior easily accessible. 260 N.W.2d at 332
72. Id. at 333.
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evidence to convict Meadows under the open bottle statute, there was
no justification for the extended search which resulted in discovery of
the pistol. The court rejected this argument saying that such a rule,
limiting the search and seizure of evidentiary items to what is merely
sufficient to convict, would "unnecessarily restrict law enforcement
officers in their attempts to apprehend law violators and to preserve
evidence of violations."73
In State v. Thompson,74 the defendant was convicted in Morton
County District Court on two counts of burglary. About 5 p. m. on
April 26, 1976, defendant Thompson arrived at the Burleigh County
Jail to visit 'a friend, Michael Morrell, who had previously confessed
to several burglaries. Morrell apparently had implicated Thompson.
Deputy Sheriff Peck detained Thompson to check out a possible war-
rant for his arrest in Morton County. Peck arrested Thompson on the
Morton County warrant and read the Miranda75 warnings to Thompson
who indicated he understood his rights. Thompson started to talk about
the burglaries but then decided "he wanted to think about it first. "
78
After a search of Thompson's car 77 he was turned over to the Morton
County Sheriff's Department. He was then taken to Bismarck police
headquarters where an officer Frohlich read him :his Miranda warn-
ings and questioned him about burglaries in Bismarck. Thompson re-
fused to talk unless he could "make a deal. ' 78 He was then questioned
by Morton County Deputy Sheriff Hoffman. Hoffman again gave
Thompson Miranda warnings. At about 7:15 p. m. Thompson con-
fessed to several burglaries and showed Hoffman where the fruits of
the burglaries were hidden. Thompson objected to the use of any evi-
dence obtained from him subsequent to the time he told Deputy Sher-
iff Peck he wanted to think about it before making a written state-
ment. The trial court found that Thompson's statements were freely
and voluntarily given. 79
The supreme court reversed in a unanimous opinion. Justice
Pedersen, writing for the court, reasoned as follows: "The State has
a heavy burden to show a waiver of the constitutional right to remain
silent, and that statements made after an indication of a wish to re-
main silent are, in fact, voluntary."s' u The court discussed several
federal cases and concluded that there was a sufficient refusal by
Thompson to talk and that the confession was involuntary. The court
also found that Thompson's desire not to talk was ignored, and his
73. Id.
74. 256 N.W.2d 706 (N.D. 1977).
75. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
76. State v. Thompson, 256 N.W.2d 706 (N.D. 1977).
77. Thompson consented to the search. Id. at 709.
78. Id.
79. Id.
So. Id. at 710.
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"subsequent statement to Hoffman was never shown to be clearly the
result of an intelligent evaluation of new information causing him to
change his mind."' ' The opinion went on to say that "[Ijack of com-
munication between police officers cannot be substituted for the neces-
sary strong proof of an intelligent, uncoerced, voluntary waiver of the
right to remain silent.' 82
In Zander v. S.J.K., 3 the court held that mere presence at the
scene of a crime is not sufficient for a conviction.8 ' On January 30,
1977, S.J.K. and three other juveniles were driving along Interstate
94 when they stopped at the Oakes rest area. All four young men en-
tered the rest room but S.J.K. left to telephone his girlfriend. While
S.J.K. was on the telephone two of his companions seriously van-
dalized the rest area and later the phone booth while the third youth
waited in the car. All of the other boys testified that S.J.K. had not
participated in any of the physical destruction of the property.8 5
The court stated the principle that mere presence at the scene of
a crime is not enough to make one an accomplice, 6 but it is one fac-
tor to be considered in conjunction with other facts.8 7 The court found
that S.J.K. had no statutory duty88 to prevent the damage which oc-
curred nor did he share the criminal intent to commit vandalism or
cause his companions to engage in such conduct.89
EVIDENCE
The court was presented with several evidence cases in which it
attempted to clarify some problem 'areas existing in the new North
Dakota Rules of Evidence.8
In State v. Jensen9° the court clarified the meaning of hearsay.92
There the defendant was tried before a jury and convicted on two
counts of murder in the second degree. 93 In reversing the verdict,9 4
the court noted a number of evidentiary errors. 95 The defendant had
been accused of murdering two hitchhikers. In his defense he offered
81. Id. at 712.
82. Id.
83. 256 N.W.2d 713 (N.D. 1977).
84. Zander v. S.J.K., 256 N.W.2d 713 (N.D. 1977).
85. Id. at 714.
86. Id. at 715, citing State v. Berger, 235 N.A.2d.254 (N.D. 1975); State v. Helmen-
stein, 163 N.W.2d 85 (N.D. 1968).
87. 256 N.W.2d at 715, citing State v.. Anderberg, 228 N.W.2d 631 (S.D. 1975).
88. 256 N.W.2d at 715.
89. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-01 (1976).
90. The North Dakota Rules of Evidence became effective February 15, 1977.
91. 251 N.W .2d 182 (V.D. 1977).
92. " 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
N.D.R. EVID. 801(c).
93. State v. Jensen, 251 N.W.2d 182, 184 (N.D. 1977).
94. Id.
95. At the time the case was tried before the trial court the new Rules of Evidence
were not in effect. On retrial, however, the new rules would be alpplicable so tih comIrt
pointed out the errors In light of the new rules. 1d. at 189.
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testimony as to the contents of conversations he had with -the two de-
cedents. This testimony was excluded as hearsay at trial.96 The trial
court's ruling was held by the court to be erroneous. It held the testi-
mony was, not hearsay97 but rather was offered to establish the state
of mind9" of the defendant which was relevant to his asserted de-
fenses. 99
The Jensen decision rightly points out that it is the purpose for
which the out-of-court statements are offered that is the most im-
portant factor in determining whether the statements are hearsay.
This should serve to alert the unwary attorney to make a proper offer
of proof if an otherwise admissible statement is objected to as hearsay.
The court went on in Jensen to rule on two other evidentiary er-
rors'00 by holding first, that a psychiatrist or other expert may base
his testimony upon reports of psychologists. not in evidence,'' and
second, that a psychiatrist or other expert may testify as to his opinion
on the ultimate fact to be determined by the jury. 10 2 These rulings
seem to be required by the new Rules of Evidence but they do repre-
sent a change from past practices.
The requirements for admissibility of a doctor's deposition,' 0 3 the
proper foundation for the excited utterance hearsay exception,'0 4 and
96. Id. at 188.
97. Id. The court stated the testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the con-
tent of the conversations. Thus, it was not hearsay. Id.
98. The court's use of the term "state of mind" here should not be confused with the
hearsay exception in N.D.R. EVID. 803(3) which excepts from hearsay a statement of the
declarant's then existing state of mind.
99. The defendant had asserted defenses of mental disease or defect excluding responsi-
bility, Intoxication and self-defense. 251 N.W.2d at 188.
100. Id. at 189.
101. Id. at 189. The applicable rule of evidence states the following:
The facts or data in the particular case upon, which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field In forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence.
N.D.R. EviD. 703.
102. 251 N.W.2d at 189. "Testimony In the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact." N.D.R. EvID. 704.
103. The use of a witness' deposition Is governed by the following rule:
The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any
party for any purpose if the court finds:
(A) that the witness is dead ; or
(B) that the witness is at a greater distance than one hundred miles
from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the state, unless it appears
that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the
deposition ; or
(C) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, ill-
ness, Infirmity, or imprisonment; or
(D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of the witness by subpoena,; or
(E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances
exist as to make it desirable, in the Interest of justice and with due regard
to the imnortance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally In open
court, to allow the deposition to be used.
N.D.R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3).
104. N.D.R. EvTD. 803(2). An excited utterance Is "[a] statement relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused
by the event or condition." Id.
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the admissibility of out-of-court statements offered to show the basis
for an expert's opinione5 are explained in Staiger v. Gaarder.0°
The court held that under the facts existing in Staiger, the doc-
tor's deposition should not have been admitted.107 The court noted that
there had been no attempt to subpoena the doctor 108 nor were there
any "exceptional circumstances' 19 in existence which would persuade
the court to allow the deposition. The plaintiff's potential savings of
some trial expenses and his attorney's personal commitment to the
doctor not to require his presence at trial were not compelling reasons
to allow the deposition when balanced against the defendant's right to
the spontaneous give-and-take that exists in a cross-examination. 10
This result seems proper for there is no reason to treat a deposition
of a doctor any differently from that of any other witness.
In defining the foundational requirements for the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule the court stated as follows: "The facts
must demonstrate (1) that there is a startling event or condition; and
(2) that the statement was the product of the declarant's stress or
excitement resulting from the startling event or condition.""' The
court said there were numerous factors to consider and that time
lapse is, important although not necessarily determinative. 112 The
court's analysis indicates that there is no strict rule and each case
must be decided according to its own facts. A delay of as long as 45
minutes does not necessarily preclude a finding of an excited utterance
if there are other facts which point to its existence."13 In this case the
delay was one and one half hours between the incident and the state-
ment.114 Also there was little testimony in the record regarding the
declarant's emotional and physical condition. 15 These facts were an
insufficient foundation on which to base an excited utterance claim.",
The court concluded by discussing the issue of whether it was er-
ror to allow an expert witness to testify as to certain out-of-court state-
ments made to him by a patrolman while both were investigating the
accident. The expert had been called to reconstruct the accident and
the statements were offered as information on which he would base
105. See supra note 101. "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and
give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless
the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or dhta on cross-examination." N.D.R. EvID. 705.
106. 258 N.NW.2d 641 (N.D. 1977).
107. Staiger v. Gaarder, 258 N.W.2d 641, 646 (N.D. 1977).
108. Id. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 32(a) (3) (d), slipra note 103.
109. 258 N.W.2d at 646. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 32(a) (3) (E) supra note 103.
110. 258 N.W.2d at 646.
111. Id. at 647.
112. Id.
113. Id., citing Trautman v. New Rockford-Fessenden Co-op Transport Ass'n., 181 N.W.2d
754 (N.D. 1970).
114. 258 N.X',.2d at 647.
115. Id. at 648.
116. Id.
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his opinion. 11 7 This testimony was allowed over a hearsay objection
and the supreme court affirmed."" The court held that these state-
ments were admissible under Rules 703 and 705 of the North Dakota
Rules of Evidence. 119
This is yet another indication of the court's willingness to allow
in as much evidence as possible if the proper offer of proof is made.
Here the statements were not offered for the truth of their content in
which case they would be objectionable as hearsay. 1 20 Rather they
were offered to supply a base for expert testimony and were admitted.
The importance of this distinction becomes clear when the result in
Staiger is contrasted to that in Fuhrman v. Fuhrman."2
In Fuhrman a mother appealed from an order of divorce which
provided that the children should reside in the family home with the
parents residing there alternately month by month, having custody of
the children during the period each would reside there. 122 She claimed
error in that the report of a social worker containing out-of-court state-
ments from the president of the parties' church, a psychologist, and a
psychiatrist was admitted over her hearsay objection. 1 23
The court reversed the divorce order :holding that the social
workers report was offered as substantive evidence and thus was in-
admissible as hearsay.12 In making their ruling the court distin-
guished between the situation before them and one in which the evi-
dence is offered solely as the basis for the opinion testimony of an ex-
pert witness. 125 It is clear from the court's opinion that the evidence
in the latter case would be admissible over a hearsay objection as it
was found to be in Staiger.
GOVERNMENT
Some interesting questions involving conflicts between govern-
mental subdivisions were decided by the court in 1977.
City of Fargo, Cass Cty. v. Harwood Tp.12 6 involved a declaratory
judgment action to determine whether land the city had acquired in
the township for use as a sanitary land fill was subject to township
zoning regulations. 2' The court held that it was. 2 8 In so holding the
court rejected the City of Fargo's claim that its power of eminent do-
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. See supra note 105.
120. See supra note 92.
121. 254 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1977).
122. Fuhrman v. Fuhrrnan, 254, N.W.2d. 97, 98 (N.D. 1977).
123. Id. at 99.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 256 N.NV.2d 694 (N.D. 1977).
127. City of Fargo, Ca-s Cty. v. Harwood Tp.. 256 N.W.2d 694, 695 (N.D. 1977).
128. Id.
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main gave it a superior right in choice of a site for its land fill.
129 The
court found that both the City of Fargo's power of eminent domain
1 30
and Harwood Township's zoning power 31 were derived from legisla.
tive grants through statutes which did not expressly authorize m-
munity from regulation of the other.13 2 Therefore, any claim of in-
herent superiority had no basis.
1 33
To determine which governmental unit would prevail the court
adopted the "balancing-of-public-interests" test.14 The court cited
with approval the trial court's definition of the test which was stated
as follows: "In adopting a balancing-of-public-interests" test, the court
grants neither of these statutes superior right, but instead gives pre-
vailing force to that statute where the more significant public interest
lies." 3 5
The court's balancing test will allow fulfillment of the essential
purpose of zoning, namely land-use planning. As such it is a step in
the right direction.
A conflict between two cities trying to annex the same tract of
land was resolved in City of West Fargo v. City of Fargo."36 The city
of West Fargo adopted a resolution of annexation covering the 160
acres in question before the City of Fargo had passed its ordinance
completing the annexation of the same 160 acres of land. 137 The court
held that West Fargo's proceedings had priority under the general rule
that proceedings first in time are first in right." 8
The court rejected both of Fargo's contentions of its priority.
First, the court held that West Fargo's proceedings were not termi-
nated or nullified by the filing of protests of more than twenty-five
percent of the landowners or the owners of more than twenty-five per-
cent of the land. 1 9 Second, the court held that West Fargo's petition
to the Annexation Review Commission after the protests were filed did
not commence a new proceeding which was later in time than Far-
go's.' 40 All of these steps are a part of an overall continuous annexa-
129. Id. at 697.
130. Specific authority exists granting the power of eminent domain to municipalities
in the acquisition of land for waste disposal. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-34-01 (1976).
131. N D. CENT. CODE § 58-03-01 (1976).
132. 256 N.W.2d at 697.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 698. The test was taken from Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293
Minm. 468. 197 N.W.2d 426 (1972).
135. 256 N.W.2d at 698.
136. 251 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1977).
137. City of Vest Fargo v. City of Fargo, 251 N.W.2d 918, 920 (N.D. 1977). West
Fargo's resolution of annexation wasx adopted on March 29, 1976. Fargo's annexation was
purportedly completed on May 18, 1976. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 921. "If the owners of one-fourth or more of the territory proposed to be
annexed protest, the city may seek annexation by petition to the annexation review com-
mission as hereinnfter providod." N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-51.2-07 (Supp. 1977).
140. 251 N.AN.2d at 921. After protest by the owners of more than one-fourth of the
land, West Fargo aolTIied for annexation to the Annexation Review Commission. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 40-51.2-08 (Supp. 1977).
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tion process. 141 Thus the rule that proceedings first in time are first
in right was applied to uphold the 'annexation by West Fargo.
INSURANCE
The court considered the usual cases involving ambiguous terms
in insurance contracts.1 4 2 One case, although involving ambiguities,
was unique and significant because the court was concerned with the
method which it would use as a tool to deal with ambiguous terms.
Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc.1 43 could represent a broader rec-
ognition in North Dakota of how the Doctrine of Reasonable Expecta-
tions is to be applied. The doctrine, simply stated, requires the court
to "ascertain that meaning of the contract which the insured would
reasonably expect.' '114 Three different approaches have been used to
apply the doctrine, two of which depend upon the finding of an am-
biguity in the terms of the contract. 1
45
In dealing with the two approaches conditioned upon a finding of
an ambiguity, the distinction between the two concerns which part of
the policy is viewed by the court in applying the doctrine. 146 Courts
using the first approach determine what an insured would reasonably
expect a particular word or phrase to mean. 147 The second approach
applies the doctrine by determining an insured's reasonable expecta-
tions in light of general coverage under a particular type of insurance
policy.148
The court split in selecting which approach should be used, leav-
ing a question as to which will be applied in North Dakota.1 49
The appellee in Zuraff v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 150
purchased a building for the alleged price of $50,000 and obtained in-
surance on the building against fire loss in the amount of $60,000.151
The evidence showed the appellee knew the building was not worth
$50,000.152 The insurer issued the policy without inspecting the prop-
141. 251 N.W.2d at 921.
142. See, e.g., Henson v. State Farm Fire & Cas Co., 252 N.W.2d 200 (N.D. 1977).
143. 250 N.W.2d 663 (N.D. 1977).
144. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107
(1966).
145. The court stated that since an ambiguity was found in the contract in this case,
the merits of the approach to the doctrine not requiring an ambiguity as a condition to
its application would not be oonsidered!. 250 N.W.2d at 672.
146. See Young, Lewis & Lee, Insurance Contract Interpretations: Issues and Trends,
625 INs. L.J. 71, 74 (1975).
147. See Golding-Keene Co. v. Quality Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 96 N.H. 64, 69 A.2d 856
(1949).
148. See Steven v. Fidelity & Cas Co. of N.Y., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 'Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1963).
149. For a complete discussion of this case, the different approaches under the doctrine,
and the implications of each see 53 N.D.L. REv. 613 (1977).
150. 252 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1977).
151. Zuraff v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 252 N.W.2d 302, 303 (N.D. 1977).
152. Brief for Appellant, app. at 17, Zuraff v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 252
N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1977).
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erty to determine its value. 153 One month after the policy was issued,
a fire totally destroyed the building and its contents. 154 In an action
brought by the appellee to recover on the policy, the insurer, alleged
that the appellee obtained the policy through fraud concerning the
value of the building insured, rendering the policy void.15 5 The district
court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment allowing re-
covery for the full amount of the policy, $60,000.156
At issue was North Dakota's Valued Policy Act 157 which provides
as follows:
Whenever any policy of insurance shall be written to in-
sure any real property in this state against loss by fire and the
insured property shall be destroyed by fire without fraud on
the part of the insured or his assigns, the stated amount of the
insurance written in such policy shall be taken conclusively to
be the true value of the property insured. 158
The appellee contends the value in the policy was conclusive, but the
insurer claims it can assert the defense of fraud by showing that the
property was overvalued at the time the policy was issued. 15 9 The
court held'60 that the valued policy statute does not prevent raising
fraud in the procurement of the insurance policy as a defense to pay-
ment under the policy. The dissent, however, would have held that the
valued policy statute binds an insurer to the value stated in the policy
and the only fraud which will prevent payment is "fraud subsequent
to the issuance of the policy or relating to the destruction of the prop-
erty. "161
The majority and dissent clashed in their interpretations of two
North Dakota cases, Jakober v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.162
and Horswill v. North Dakota Mutual Fire Insurance Co.163 The ma-
jority relied upon these two cases to formulate its conclusion while
the dissent, although conceding that language in both cases supported
the majority's decision, correctly pointed out that this language is
dictum. However, dictum provides an indication to courts of how re-
lated issues might be appropriately decided at a later time and if
found to be supported by any reasonable theory can provide the basis
of new decisions. In this respect the dissent is incorrect. In a like man-
153. 252 N.W.2d at 309.
154. Id. at 303.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 304.
157. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-18-08 (1978).
158. Id.
159. 252 N.W.2d at 305.
160. Id. at 309.
161. Id. at 311 (Vogel, J., dissenting).
162. 49 N.D. 270, 191 N.WV. 480 (1922).
13. 45 N.D. 600, 178 NAN'. 798 (1920).
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ner however, the majority was weak in its reasoning to support the
decision.
Neither the court, nor the briefs of the parties considered 'an
Eighth Circuit case decided shortly after Jakober and Horswill which
would have provided the legal muscle to strengthen the dictim of the
North Dakota case law. United States Fire Insurance Co. of New York
v. Sullivan'64 presented a case very similar to Zuraff. The pertinent
sections of the valued policy statute in Sullivan1 65 are identical to the
valued policy statute in Zuraff. The plaintiff was alleged to have in-
sured a building for a substantial amount more than he knew the
building to be valued. The Court expressly found that the statute did
provide the insurer a defense of fraud in the procurement of the policy
in respect to value. 166 As the majority in Zuraff pointed out, one of the
purposes of a valued policy statute is to prevent overinsurance by dis-
couraging insurance companies from collecting premiums on over-
valued property and then contesting liability when loss occurs. 67 Al-
though it was the insurance companies which originally engaged in
the practice of promoting overinsurance of property, it is likewise con-
ceivable that property owners could defraud an insurer by overvaluing
their property. The purpose of the statute can be accomplished only
if the insurer, too, has some defense to the fraudulent acts of an in-
sured, whether in procuring the policy or subsequently.
To this point in its decision, the majority in Zuraff is correct.
Where the majority erred was in failing to find a duty in the insurer
to inspect the property before issuing the policy in order to determine
the value of the property insured. Although the majority disagrees
with the dissent's reasoning that Nathan v. St. Paul Mutual Insurance
Co. 68 provides for a duty to inspect 169 in North Dakota, one of the ma-
jority's own cases suggests there is such a duty to inspect. 70 The
[insurer] could have ascertained the value [of the property] before
issuing its policy. If it did not do so, it should have.' 7'1 1 The Sullivan
case also supports this proposition. 17 2
The majority suggests a failure to inspect long 'after the policy is
issued might be an estoppel to the insurer asserting a fraud defense. 178
164. 25 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 608 (1928).
165. NEB. STAT. COMPILED § 7809 (1922) (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. § 4,4-380
(1943)).
166. United States Fire Tns. Co. of New York v. Sullivan, 25 F.2d 40, 42 (8th Cir. 1928).
cert. denied, 278 U.S. 608 (1928).
167. 252 N.W.2d at 305.
168. 243 Minn. 430, 68 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1955).
169. The majority denied Nathan's authority for the proposition that a duty to inspect
exists in North Dakota because duty in Nathan was set out in a Minnesota statute. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 65A.08 (West 1968).
170. See Horswill v. North Dakota Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 45 N.D. 600, 607, 178 N.W. 798,
800 (1920).
171. Id.
172. 25 F.2d at 42.
173. 252 N.W.2d at 309.
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The Horswill and Sullivan reasoning, however, requires an inspection
before issuing the policy as a condition precedent to asserting the de-
fense of fraud. The latter is the better approach because it obviates
the need to determine in each case what a reasonable period of time
is before the estoppel attaches.
Sullivan presents, a better rule than either of those offered by the
Zuraff majority or dissent. To restate that rule-an insurer has the
duty to inspect the property before issuing the policy to establish its
value. If the insurer performs its duty, "it is bound by its estimate of
value based thereon unless conditions (reducing value), not ascertain-
able by a reasonably careful inspection and known to the insured, are
withheld by the insured. ' ' 174
PARENT-CHILD
The court was confronted with several cases dealing with the ter-
mination of parental rights pursuant to the Uniform Juvenile Court
Act,'1 75 one of which was In Interest of R.L.D.176 When the supreme
court reviews decisions under the Act, the scope of review is much
broader than in other cases and is much like a trial de novo.177 The
factors to be established in such a termination proceeding, as has been
stated in numerous previous decisions, are (1) that the child is a "de-
prived child"; 178 that the conditions and causes of the deprivation are
likely to continue or will not be demedied, and (2) that because of the
deprivation, the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physi-
cal or emotional harm. The state has the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the existence of each of the factors. 179
Upon reviewing the record and files, the court first concluded that
R.L.D. was a "deprived child," that the deprivation was likely to con-
tinue, and that R.L.D. would probably suffer serious harm. 80 In addi-
tion to the rather routine substantive issues, several procedural issues
were raised by the mother of R.L.D. In ruling on these issues, the
court held that although there must be a finding that any deprivation
174. 25 F.2d at 42.
175. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-20 (1974), as ,mended, (Supp. 1977).
176. 253 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1977).
177. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-56(1) (1974). The statute authorizes the court to re-
examine "the files, records, and minutes or transcript of the evidence of the Juvenile
court, giving appreciable weight to the findings of the juvenile court." Id. This standard
of review can be contrasted with that used in child custody cases in. which the trial
court's findings will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Fergu-
son, 202 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1972).
178. "Deprived child" is defined to be a child who "[ils without proper parental care
or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary
for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals, and the deprivation Is not due
primarily to the lack of financial means of his parents, guardian, or other custodian."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(5) (a) (1974). The "best interest of the child" standard used
In child custody cases is not applicable In terminating parental rights. In Interest of
M.L., 239 N.W.2d 2;9, 295 (N.D. 1976).
179. In Interest of R.L.D., 253 N.W.2d 870. 874 (N.D. 1977.
180. Id. at .975-76.
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is likely to continue before parental rights will be terminated, a peti-.
tion is not defective for failing to allege that fact.18' Furthermore, the
court saw no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's refusal to allow
R.L.D. to testify, since the goal of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act is
to protect the welfare of the child and the potential stress resulting to
a nine year old in testifying outweighed any benefit to be gained from
such testimony. 18 2 On another issue, the court held that there is no
duty to supplement interrogatories which were part of a! discovery
process of a separate and distinct action which had been dismissed,
even though the supplementation would have aided the defense in the
present case.
In Odegard v. Odegard,5 3 the court again stated the standard to
be used in determining child custody issues was the best interest of the
child, not fitness of or fairness to the parents. The plaintiff and the
defendant, parents of a four year old child, were separated in 1976
when the wife left, leaving the child in the custody of his father, who
was living with his parents. The father instituted divorce proceedings,
and in his memorandum opinion, the trial judge found that the best
interest of the child would be served by granting custody of the child
to the father and the grandparents, rather than to the mother.'8 The
mother asserted on appeal that the court's findings were clearly er-
roneous in that she was deprived of custody because she was a poor
housekeeper. She further alleged that it was improper to give custody
to "strangers," i.e., the grandparents, and also to ignore the "tender
years" doctrine.
The court restated that the finding that the best interest of the
child requires custody in one parent or another is a finding of fact
which will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.8 5 The court went
on to note that the statute embodying the "tender years" doctrine had
been repealed,8 " but that the repeal did not alter the fact that mothers
a:re most often better able to care for their infants than are the
fathers. 18 That fact, however, is only one of the considerations to be
weighed in ascertaining what is to be the best interest of the child. 88
Although other jurisdictions have held that grandparents are con-
181. Id at 877.
182. Id.
183. 259 N.,V.2d 484 (N.D. 1977).
184. Odegard v. Odegard, 259 N.W.2d 484, 485 (N.D. 1977). The mother was given cus-
tody for one month each summer and one day each week. Id. n.1.
185. See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 202 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1972) ; N.D.R. Civ. P. 52(a).
186. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-10-06 (1960) (repealed 1973).
187. Once the court gives judicial notice to this fact, it may be questioned to what
extent the "ghost" of the "tender years" doctrine will return as a judicial rule rather
than a statutory one. Language in the opinion might indicate that the court is already en-
couraging the use by the trial courts of the "tender years" doctrine. See note 188 in fra.
188. The court stated the finding was not clearly erroneous, but suggested that if It bad
tried the case in the first Instance, It might have made a different determination. 259
N.W.2d at 486.
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sidered strangers in awarding custody,5 9 North Dakota has not done
so, 'and has awarded custody to grandparents, either alone or jointly
with a parent. 190 Furthermore, the court held that the fact that the
mother's parents were relatively wealthy is not controlling but only
one factor in ascertaining the best interest of the child.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-ATTORNEYS
Application of Christianson'9' initiates a new way of conditioning
reinstatement of a suspended or disbarred attorney. Prior to Christian-
son, reinstatement was conditioned solely upon an application setting
forth facts showing that the applicant was entitled to have the disci-
plinary order "vacated, terminated or modified. ' ' 19 2 The facts must
show the applicant to be of good moral character and the proof must
be sufficient to overcome the court's former adverse judgment of the
applicant's character.' 9' Christianson declares the authority of the
North Dakota Supreme Court to require a reexamination as an addi-
tional condition of reinstatement of 'a suspended or disbarred attor-
ney. 04 While the authority of the court is not challenged, 195 the desir-
ability and propriety of such a condition, especially in circumstances
involving suspension, is seriously questioned.
Christianson was originally suspended in 1956196 after being con-
victed of a felony. 197 He was reinstated in 1957.198 In 1970, Christian-
son was again suspended for reasons of misconduct. 99 His petition for
reinstatement was denied in 1972 because of additional findings that
Christianson had practiced law while suspended and had engaged in
other improper conduct. 20 0 Reinstatement was again requested in 1973
but again denied for practicing law while under suspension. 20 1 Upon
application for reinstatement in 1974, the Grievance Commission
recommended and the court agreed that reinstatement would not be
allowed until Christianson retook and passed the bar examination. 20 2
189. See, e.g., Blow v. Lottman, 75 S.D. 127, 59 N.,.2d 825 (1953). See generally, 27B
C.J.S. Divorce § 308 (1959).
190. See, e.g., McKay %*. Mitzel, 137 N.W.2d 792 (N.D. 1965).
191. 253 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1977).
192. N.D.R. DiSCIPLENARY P. 13.
193. Application of Christianson, 202 N.A.2d 756, 759 (N.D. 1972), quoting In re Simp-
son, 11 N.D. 526, 93 NWV. 918 (1903).
194. Application of Christianson, 253 N.W.2d 410, 413 (N.D. 1977).
195. The supreme court may make all necessary rules for the reinstatement of attorneys.
N.D. CES,-r. COnE § 27-02-07 (1974).
196. Application of Christianson, 215 N.1,V.2d 920, 921 (N.D. 1974).
197. See Christianson v. United States, 226 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 994 (1956).
198. 215 N.W''.2d at 921.
199. In re Christianson, 175 N.'W.2d 8 (N.D. 1970). The misconduct Included selling
estate property without court authority, failing to account for the proceedo from the
sale of that property, failing to return costs to a client for work he did not accomplish
and paying a note with a "no account" check Id. at 10
200. 202 N.W.2d at 75S.
201. 215 N.W.2d at 922.
202. 253 N.V.2d at 411.
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He did not take the bar examination but rather reapplied for reinstate-
ment in 1976 arguing he should not be required to be reexamined. 03
Any acts committed contrary to accepted standards of honesty,
justice or morality may constitute cause for discipline of an attor-
ney.2  The Code sets forth those acts which are cause for discipline.20 5
These acts concern misconduct as an attorney; they do not involve the
attorney's mental capabilities. 20 6 It is questionable to believe that
examining the applicant's mental capacity will provide evidence from
which his moral capacity can be judged.
While the court recognized that North Dakota had never before
required reexamination as a condition for the reinstatement of an at-
torney,207 the court attempted to soften the impact of its decision by
noting that six other states have implemented reexamination pro-
cedures.208 The reach of the Christianson decision, however, goes far
beyond the reexamination procedures of those states.
In California, a general reexamination is not to be used in cases
of suspension,2 0 9 should be used only rarely in disbarment cases, 210
and then only when there has been a general charge of lack of legal
attainment as opposed to a charge related to conduct involving a par-
ticular client.2 11 In cases of suspension, and presumably disbarment
as well, the court can condition reinstatement upon taking a "Pro-
fessional Responsibility Examination."1 12 The Washington cases relied
upon by the court involved disbarred attorneys.21 The Wisconsin case
cited concerned the reinstatement of an attorney who had abandoned
his law practice twenty years earlier. 2 14 Abandoning one's practice is
different from being suspended. The former does not inherently in-
clude an expectation of return to practice as does the latter. Without
this expectation in one's thoughts, it is easier to presume that the one
who abandoned his practice has not been attentive to changes in the
law. The Florida rules apply to disbarred attorneys only.2 15 As the
court admitted,' 16 the Arkansas case, In re Dodrill,2"7 did not deal di-
rectly with the issue of reexamination. Finally, in Ohio, it is conceded
that suspended attorneys are subject to reexamination as a condition
203. Id.
204. 175 N.W.2d at 8-9.
205. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-14-02 (Supp. 1977).
206. Id.
207. 253 N. W.2d at 412.
208. The states are California, Washington, Florida, Wisconsin, Arkansas and Ohio. Id.
209. Friday v. State Bar, 23 Cal. 2d 501, 144 P.2d 564, 568 (1943).
210. Id. at -, 144 P.2d at 569.
211. Id. at -, 144 P.2d at 568. Merely because an attorney has been disciplined for
some rule infraction is no reason to aesime that he Is not a qualified lawyer. Id.
212. Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 878, 544 P.2d 929, 126 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1976).
213. See Petition of Simmons, 81 Wash. 2d 43, 499 P.2d 874 (1972): Petition of Eddie-
man, 79 Wash. 2d 725, 489 P.2d 174 (1971 ).
214. State v. Brodson, 11 Wis. 2d 124, 103 N.W.2d 912, 913 (1960).
215. FLA. BAR R. art. XI, rule 11.10(4).
216. 253 N.W.2d at 412.
217. 538 S.W.2d 519 (Ark 1976).
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of reinstatement.2 18 Ohio appears to be an extraordinary situation
nonetheless, because reinstatement into the bar is impossible for any
attorney disbarred or one who has voluntarily surrendered his license
to practice.2 19
Christianson does not provide a standard to be used in determining
when reexamination will be imposed as a condition for reinstatement.
It might be inferred that the "shopping list" approach of In re Cate2 0
would be used or as the dissent suggests, the court might establish a
system for reexamining "all lawyers who have been out of the prac-
tice for seven or more years. ' 22 1
It is unfortunate that a suspended attorney will be branded by the
same stigma as a disbarred attorney in that he may be subjected to
a general reexamination as a condition to his reinstatement as an at-
torney. The California approach discussed above seems to be the more
reasonable procedure. That approach retains the distinction between
suspension and disbarment. Provision for a "Professional Responsi-
bility Examination" does supply the disciplinary body with tangible
evidence which can be used to judge the moral capacity of the appli-
cant. In the ultimate case, where the attorney has been charged with
a lack of legal attainment, the court reserves discretion to require a
general reexamination.
TAXATION
In Butts Feed Lots v. Board of Cty. Commissioners,222 the court
was presented with the issue of the tax exempt status of farm struc-
tures.223 The appellant was a corporation which sought tax exempt
status for a farm residence, quonsets, grain storage facilities, and
feeder pens, all related to its cattle feeding operation. The trial court
had affirmed a denia1 of the Board of County Commissioners to allow
the exemption. On appeal, the supreme court was not persuaded by
the appellee's argument that because 'a corporation cannot engage 'in
farming in North Dakota, Butts, being a corporation, should be estop-
ped from claiming an exemption for farm buildings. 224 Ownership of
218. RULES FOR THE GOV'T OF THE BAR OF OHIO V (25).
219. RULES FOR THE GOV'T OF THE BAR OF OHIO V (7).
220. 77 Cal. App. 495, 247 P. 231 (1926).
221. 253 N.WV.2d at 414 (Pederson, J., dissenting).
222. 261 N.V.2d 667 (N.D. 1977).
223. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-08(15) (Supp. 1977) states that the following will be
exempt from taxation:
All farm structures, and improvements located on agricultural lands. This
subsection shall be construed to exempt farm buildings and Improvements
only, and shall not be construed to exempt from taxation industrial plants,
or structures of anNI kind not used or Intended for use as a part of a farm
plant, or as a farm residence. Any structure or structures used in connection
with a retail or wholesale business other than farming, even though situated
on agricultural land, shall not be exempt undler this'subsection.
224. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-01 (1976) prohibits all corporations, *xcept as otherwise
provided, from engaging In the business of farming or agriculture.
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the particular structures is not determinative of the exemption and
enforcement of the corporate farming law is the duty of the county 'at-
torney in a separate action.
Thus, finding that Butts' corporate status not to be determinative,
the court turned to the merits of Butts' contention, and held that in
order for an enterprise to come within the farm structure exemption,
it must, at a minimum, have the following:
(1) a single tract or contiguous tracts of agricultural land
containing a minimum of ten acres, (2) devoted, at least in.
part, to cultivation, (3) which results in the raising and pro-
duction of plant and animal life in an unprocessed state, (4)
the fruits of which production normally contribute a substan-
tial proportion of the net income of the beneficial owner of
agricultural land, (5) with the buildings and structures situ-
ated on the land being those reasonable and conducive to the
farming enterprise.2 25
Finding that Butts purchased almost all of its feed from outside
sources, the court saw the Butts operation of fattening cattle as in-
dustrial, not deserving of the farm structure exemption. 2 6 The opinion
represents a good effort by the court, in a well organized and well
written opinion, to consolidate a number of definitions and statutes in
order to arrive at a test which may be applied to future factual set-
tings.
In William Clairmont, Inc. v. State,2 7 the court addressed a num-
ber of issues involving the state special fuel tax. The appellant was a
corporation engaged in construction work for the federal government
on federal projects. It brought suit against the State of North Dakota
for a refund of special fuel taxes it 'had paid on diesel fuel, which it
claimed it was exempt from. 22 8 The statute relied upon by the appel-
lants, stated that special fuel used for industrial purposes shall be
exempt from the special fuel tax. 229 The state's defense was based on
a statute which prohibits refunds to be paid to any person performing
work paid for from public funds.230 The trial court held that the state
need not return taxes collected prior to the service of the summons
'and complaint in the action, but must pay back all sums collected
thereafter.
225. Butts Feed Lots v. Board of Cty. Comm'r, 261 N.W.2d 667, 671-72 (N.D. 1977).
226. Id. at 673.
227. 261 N.1V.2d 780 (N.D. 1977).
228. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 57-52 (Supp. 1977) contains a comprehensive scheme of taxa-
tion of special fuels which parallels the statutes governing gasoline contained in N.D.
CENT. CODE ch. 57-54 (Supp. 1977).
229. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-52-04 (Supp. 1977). The statute as amended would change
the result of the Instant case since it provides that fuel used in the performance of a
government contract, even though for an industrial purpose, Is not exempt from the fuel
tax.
230. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-56-05.1 (1972).
657
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
In an opinion outlining the history of the special fuel tax and its
exemptions to the present day, including the industrial use exemption,
the court properly saw the restriction of refunds inapplicable. Since
the appellants were exempt from the tax in the first instance, they
were not seeking "refunds" but restitution of taxes illegally col-
lected. 23 1
But once recognizing that the state had illegally collected the
taxes, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that only taxes
paid after service of the summons and complaint, could be re-
covered.23 2 This was based on the general rule that taxes voluntarily
paid cannot be recovered by the taxpayer.23 3 Although it initially ap-
pears questionable, in view of penalties for failure to pay taxes, that
any payment of taxes is truly voluntary, the decision appears to con-
form with not only prior North Dakota law, but also the law in other
jurisdictions.24 Only after the service of the summons and complaint
were the taxes paid under protest.2 35
FORTS
The supreme court, in an informative opinion, discussed the rela-
tionship between the Wrongful Death Act and the intestate succession
law in determining who are heirs at law for purposes of recovery for
wrongful death. In Broderson v. Boehm,256 'as a result of injuries suf-
fered in an automobile collision, Pauline (mother) and Debra (daugh-
ter) Boehm died, leaving as survivors the father and two daughters.
A wrongful death action was commenced by Debra's administrator to
recover for Debra's death, naming as defendants the driver of the
other vehicle and his father, the county, and the decedent's father.2 ,
Named as beneficiaries in the action were the surviving daughters and
the father, the daughters claiming loss of loving care, advice, guid-
ance, etc., and the father claiming loss of assistance in caring for the
younger children.238 The trial court held that evidence showing losses
suffered by Debra's sisters was inadmissible on the grounds that the
father was the "sole heir at law, ' 239 and thus the only beneficiary en-
titled to recover.
North Dakota's Death by Wrongful Act provisions 240 state who may
231. William Clairmont, Inc. v. State, 261 N.W.2d 780, 784 (N.D. 1977).
232. Id. at 786.
233. See e.g., Rushton v. Burke, 6 Dak. 478, 43 N.W. 815 (1889).
234. See WORDS AND PHRASES, "Voluntary Payment" (1962).
235. It would be possible to voice such a protest before service of a summons and com-
plaint. In this particular case, however, there was no indication of any objection or pro-
test of any kind prior to that date. 261 N.W.2d at 876.
236. 253 N.W.2d 864 (N.D. 1977).
237. The decedent's father was named as a defendant because he was the owner of the
vehicle driven by Pauline Boehm and thus could be held vicariously liable under the family
purpose doctrine. Broderson v. Boehm, 253 N.W.2d 864, 868 (N.D. 1977).
238. Id. at 866.
239. Id.
240. N.D. CFNT. CODE ch. 32-21 (1976). a.9 amended, (Supp. 1977).
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bring a wrongful death action and in what order they must proceed.
Brothers and sisters are not named as being able to initiate the ac-
tion.24 1 The action, however is to be for the benefit of the "heirs at
law." 242 It had been previously held that the class of "heirs at law"
entitled to be beneficiaries was broader than the class entitled to initi-
ate the action, 243 and that the former included surviving brothers and
sisters.24 4 But in all the cited cases which allowed recovery to brothers
and sisters, either the parents were dead or legally disqualified from
recovering. 245 Furthermore, it had been most commonly held that ab-
sent contrary intent, the word "heirs" means those who take under the
statutes of descent. 246 The intestacy statute provided that only if there
was no issue, spouse, or parent surviving would the estate go to the
brothers and sisters. 247 The court thus concluded, in conformance with
the weight of authority, that "heirs at law" in the Wrongful Death
Act includes only those persons who by the law of descent would suc-
ceed to the property in case of intestacy, but in addition, if members
of a preferred class are disqualified to recover for reasons other than
death, those next entitled to inherit would be considered as bene-
ficiaries. 24 Because the decedent's father was neither dead nor dis-
qualified from recovering, and thus first in line to benefit from the
action, the sisters were barred from recovery. 24 9
In another case involving the Wrongful Death Act, Schneider v.
Baisch,250 the sole issue before the court was the amount of damages
241. 253 N.W.2d at 866, citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-03 (1976). The statute states
'in part as follows: "The action shall be brought by the following persons in the order
named: 1. The surviving husband or wife, if any. 2. The surviving children, if any. 3.
The surviving mother or father. 4. The personal representative." N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-03
(1976).
242. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-04 (1976) reads as follows:
The amount recovered shall not be liable for the debts of the decedent.
but shall inure to the exclusive benefit of his heirs at law in such shares
as the judge before whom the case is tried shall fix in the order for judg-
ment, and for the purposes of determining such shares, the judge after the
trial may make any investigation which he deems necessary.
(Emphasis added).
243. Stangeland v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 105 Minn. 224, 117 N.W. 386
(1908).
244. See e.g., Satterberg v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 19 N.D. 38, 121
N.W. 70 (1909). Some courts have restricted "heirs" to never include collateral heirs.
See e.g., Blom v. United Air-Lines, Inc., 152 Colo. 486, 382 P.2d 993 (1963).
245. See Sanders v. Green, 208 F. Supp. 873 (D.C.S.C. 1962) ; Swenson v. McDaniel, 119
F. Supp. 152 (D.C. Nev. 1953); Wilson v. City and County of San Francisco, 106 Cal.
App. 2d 440, 235 P.2d 81 (1951); Fuchs v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 132 La. 782, 61 So.
790 (1913) ; Pries v. Ashland Home Tel. Co., 143 Wis. 606, 128 N.W. 281 (1910).
If a statute is worded "next of kin," courts often allow recovery by siblings despite
the fact that the parents are still living. See e.g., Martz v. Revier, 284 Minn. 166, 170
N.W.2d 83 (1969). "Next of kin," however, is not synonomous with "heirs at law."
246. See e.g., Schaefer v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 160 N.W.2d 318
(Iowa 1968).
247. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-04 (1972), (repealed 1975) (curren.t version at N.D. CENT.
CODE ch. 30.1-04 (1976), as amended, (Supp. 1977)). The current verison was adopted
from the Uniform Probate Code. It does not change the outcome of the present case.
248. 253 N.W.2d at 869.
249. Id. at 870.
25n. 256 N.W.2d 370 (N.D. 1977).
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to be awarded. 251 The decedent was killed in an automobile collision,
leaving as survivors his fifty-six year old wife and two adult children.
Eleven months after the collision and prior to trial of the wrongful
death action, the decedent's wife died of cancer. The action was
brought by one of the children, John, on his own behalf and as per-
sonal representative of his mother's estate, 252 and by the other child,
Colleen. On the issue of damages, the trial court awarded the wife's
estate a sum based on her life expectancy at age fifty-six, 253 rather
than on her actual survival lifetime of eleven months. On appeal, the
supreme court reversed the trial court's decision, following the weight
of authority in other jurisdictions. The court, in what would appear to
be a well reasoned opinion except for the dissent, held that when a.
beneficiary dies prior to the trial of the wrongful death action, and the
action is pursued by the personal representative of the estate, the ele-
ment of uncertainty regarding life expectancy is removed and dam-
ages can properly be awarded based on actual survival time.254 Since
the theory behind awarding damages in wrongful death actions is to
compensate the beneficiary rather than to punish the wrongdoer,2 5 5
the court's decision, besides being in line with the weight of authority,
appears logical in that an award of damages without regard to actual
losses loses its character as compensation, and acts more as a punish-
ment. The dissent25 6 seems to have overlooked this fact when it sug-
gested that the defendant should not enjoy a windfall because of the
fortuitous death of a survivor. It seems incorrect to look, as did the
dissent, at the defendant's point of view as it would be if wrongful
death awards were punitive. Recovery is based solely on compensation
to the beneficiary and it is only reasonable that 'a survivor who lives
eleven months should be compensated for those eleven months rather
than receive an award based on her life expectancy before she
died.257
251. The defendant admitted liability pursuant to contractual stipulatiog. Schneider v.
Baisch, 256 N.W.2d 370 (N.D. 1977).
252. Pursuant to N.D. CENT. CODE 4 32-21-05 (1976), as amended, (Supp. 1977). death
does not abate a cause of action, thus the wife's right to recovery as a beneficiary of the
wrongful death action survives to the benefit of her estate.
253. Because damages are based on the loss suffered by the beneficiaries and not on the
loss sustained by the decedent's estate, the life expectancy of both the decedent and the
beneficiary are relevant factors. The award is based on the life expectancy which is
shortest as between the decedent and the beneficiary since the beneficiary could expect
no contribution from the decedent beyond the life expectancy of either the decedent or the
beneficiary. 256 N.W.2d at 371-72.
254. Id. at 372. See Wakefield v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 253 So. 2d, 667 (La. App.
1971), writ denied, 260 La. 286, 255 So. 2d 771 (1972): Adams v. Sparacio, 196 S.E.2d
647 (W. Va, 1979). See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1291 (1955) ; S. SPEISER, RECOVERY
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 8.21 (2d ed. 1975).
255. See Hyyti v. Smith, 67 N.D. 425, 272 N.W. 747 (1937) (held that punitive damages
are not recoverable in a wrongful death action).
256. The dissent was authored by Associate Justice Vogel.
257. Justice Vogel can be commended for his thoughtful discussion concerning the re-
liance on decisions from other states. Certainly it is the court's function to fix the law
of this state and to disregard unreasonable out-of-state decisions. But these decisions
should not be disregarded Just because they originate from courts outside this state, if in
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In a well written opinion, the court, in Olson v. Chesterton Co.,258
expanded the doctrine of strict liability in tort.259 Olson was seriously
injured when, while he was applying a belt dressing on a stalled con-
veyor belt, the belt suddenly engaged, pushing his hand into the ma-
chinery. He brought an action for strict liability in tort against the
manufacturer of the belt dressing.
The label on the belt dressing can had warned that the product
should be 'applied to only running belts, but the plaintiff alleged that
the warning was inadequate, constituting a! defect making the product
unreasonably dangerous. 2 0 At the trial, the jury returned a verdict for
Olson in the amount of $400,000 dollars. On appeal, the defendant
claimed three defenses-misuse of the product, the "obvious or patent
danger" rule, 'and assumption of risk. The question before the court
was whether a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in
the alternative for a new trial, should have been granted. 261
As to the defense of misuse of the product, the court followed the
Restatement position 262 that one who sells a product has a duty to
warn not only of dangers in its intended use but also to warn of dan-
gers involved in a use which can be reasonably anticipated. 26 Whether
a risk is reasonably foreseeable is a jury question, and the court con-
cluded that a jury could reasonably find that Olson's misuse of the
product was forseeable. The most noteworthy issue in the case was
that concerning the obviousness of the risk. The "obvious danger"
rule relieves the seller of his duty to warn the consumer of dangers
so obvious that no warning is deemed necessary. 264 Thus if this rule
fact they support the most reasonable position. The dissent relied on the Pattern Jury
Instructions to support the view that the health of the beneficiary should be viewed at
the time of the decedent's death for purposes of awarding damages. In furher support,
the dissent offered examples illustrating how the defendant benefits when the beneficiary
dies before trial, and yet pays nothing extra if the beneficiary outlives her life expectancy.
What appears to have been Ignored by the dissent are the policies behind the majority's
position. When the beneficiary dies before trial there is no policy supporting recovery by
the beneficiary's estate of an amount greater than what is needed to actually compensate
the beneficiary, for any additional recovery would act as punishment against the de-
fendant. See supra note 255. But when the beneficiary outlives her life expectancy, al-
though she is in fact not fully compensated, there is a countervailing policy favoring fi-
nality of Judgments. Therefore, the two situations cannot be fairly compared.
258. 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977).
259. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966) was adopted in North Dakota In
Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974).
260. The applicable standard of review was as follows:
When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict or for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, the court must decide whether the evidence is such that,
without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the
weight of the evidence, reasonable men could reach but one conclusion as
to the verdict ....
Nokota Feeds, Inc. v. State Bank of Lakota, 210 N.W.2d 182, 187 (N.D. 1973).
261. Comment j to § 402A of the Restatement states that inadequacy of warnings or
directions may render a prod uct unreasonably dangerous. The plaintiff did not allege
the dressing or the container to be defective. Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d
530, 535 (N.D. 1977).
262. RFSTATEME!ENr (SECOND) OF To'rs § 402A, Comment h (1965).
263. See 63 Am. JuR. 2d Products Liability § 136 (1972). This dual duty had been rec-
ognized in Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974) for actions in
strict liability in tort.
2r4, Scc Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.R.2d 802 (1950). New York has since
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was to be followed, the defendant would "ipso facto" be relieved of lia-
bility if the risk from misuse which injured the plaintiff was obvious,
even though such misuse, from the defendant's standpoint, was fore--
seeable. North Dakota had previously declined to follow the rule in
negligence ca,ses, 265 and other authorities had carried over the abroga-
tion into the strict products liability area. 2C6 Properly recognizing that
the whole theory behind strict liability in tort is to place special re-
sponsibilities upon manufacturers of defectively dangerous products,
the court found the "obvious risk" rule to be incompatible with that
theory, and thus held it to be inapplicable as a per se rule in North
Dakota. 26 7 As would be expected, however, the obviousness of the risk,
although not an automatic defense to. liability for failure to warn, is
still relevant toward the doctrine of assumption of risk, a valid defense
in strict liability in tort. 268 Assumption of risk is a factual determina-
tion, and using the applicable standard of review, the court found sub-
stantial evidence on which the jury could conclude that the plaintiff
did not appreciate the risk which he confronted. 269
The reasoning in the court's decision can be commended as being
in conformance with the spirit behind strict products liability in tort,
and the fine manner in which the opinion was written, dealing with a
wide scope of issues, should make it a valuable source to future liti-
gants .270
In a case more noteworthy for its procedural implications
than for its impact on substantive tort law, the court modified its
stance on the presumption of negligence against a bailee who fails to
account for nondelivery of bailed goods. In F-M Potatoes v. Suda,271
in an action by the plaintiff-bailor against the defendant-bailee for the
bailee's failure to maintain proper temperature control which resulted
in the deterioration of certain bailed potatoes, the trial court imposed
abrogated the rule in negligence cases. See Micallef v. Miehle Co., etc., Inc., 39 N.Y.2d
376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
265. See Johanson v. Nash Finch Co., 216 N.W.2d 271 (N.D. 1974).
266. See e.g., Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Byrns v. Riddel.
Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P2d 1065 (1976) ; Luque v. Mclean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163.
104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972). See generally 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTS LIABILITT §
16A[5] (1976).
267. 256 N.W.2d at 537.
268. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965). In Wentz v.
Deseth, 221 N.W.2d 101 (N.D. 1974), the elements of assumption of risk were identified
as (1) knowledge of abnormal danger, (2) voluntary exposure to it, (3) freedom cf
choice to avoid it, and (4) injury proximately caused by the abnormal danger. Id. Thus,
obviousness of the danger would be relevant toward whether the plaintiff had subjective
knowledge of the danger.
269. 256 N.W.2d at 538.
270. Several other issues were decided by the court in a careful and detailed manner.
Among the more notable ones was the Issue of admissibility of testimony from an expert
In man-machine relationships, which the court held was in the proper discretion of the
trial court. Id. at 539. On the Issue of the admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence In
strict liability cases, after recognizing the split in. authority, the court logically held
that In strict liability cases, the issue Is the condition of the product, not the conduct of
the defendant. Thus, state-of-the-art evidence Is of low probative value, the exclusion of
such is not an abuse of discretion. 7d. at 540.
271. 259 N."W.2d 487 (N.D. 1977).
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upon F-M, as bailee, a presumption of negligence.2 72 The effect of such
a presumption places the burden on a defendant to prove absence of
his negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. 273 This became one
of the issues asserted on appeal.
The court recognized that the bailed goods, i.e., potatoes, were
perishable goods which ordinarily deteriorate from inherent condi-
tions, absent any negligence. The court went on to hold, in conform-
ance with other authorities, 274 that when loss to perishable goods is in-
volved, there is no presumption of negligence against the bailee.2
75
Therefore the burden of proving negligence by a preponderance of
the evidence remains with the plaintiff as it would in a non-bailment
action. Undoubtedly, this case can have noticeable effects in an agri-
culturally based state such as North Dakota, where the bailment of
perishable goods is a common phenomenon. Perhaps an important
question yet unanswered is what agricultural products will be deemed
to be in the category "perishable" as that term is used by the court. 276
By statute, however, a common type of bailment, that of seed and
grain, will in most cases not be affected by this decision, even if the
particular product is deemed "perishable," since negligence will not
be an issue. 277
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
One of the major decisions of the North Dakota Supreme Court's
1977 term was its July 27 ruling in Peoples Bank and Trust v.
Reiff. 278 The majority of the court held that since a rider to a subordi-
nation agreement executed by the plaintiff bank specifically referred
to the secured transactions article of the Uniform Commercial Code27 9
and the agreement and rider were interwoven with sales of goods and
security transactions specifically covered by the Uniform Commercial
272. F-M Potatoes, Inc. v. Suda, 259 N.W.2d 487, 491 (N.D. 1977). North Dakota had
adopted the rule that when the plaintiff shows the existence of a bailment for hire and
nondelivery by the bailee of the bailed goods in their original condition, a presumption
of negligence arises against the bailee. McKenzie v. Hanson, 143 N.W.2d 697 (N.D. 1966).
273. N.D.R. EvID. 301.
274 See Grady v. Blue Line Transfer & Storage Co., 195 Iowa 300, 190 N.W. 375 (1922)
Southern Ice & Util, Co. v. Stewart, 15 S.W.2d 132, 136 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) ; Lopeman
v. Gee, 40 Wash. 2d 586, 245 P.2d 183 (1952). See also Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 1298, 1328
(1963).
275. 259 N.W.2d at 491.
276. The court appears to define "perishable" goods as those goodis "which ordinarily
deteriorate in the course of time from inherent or natural conditions." Id. This could
possibly be seen to include a wide variety of agricultural products other than potatoes.
277. N.D. CENT. CODE § 60-02-22 (1960), a rather obscure statute which has not been
repealed since the passage of the U.C.C. version of the duty of care owed by a bailee,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-07-10(1) (1968), appears to say that in the case of a public ware-
houseman acting as a bailee for grain or seed, in the event of loss of such grain or seed,
the bailee is absolutely liable without regard to negligence. In such an action, burden of
Proof would have no effect, except in the establishment of the bailment relationship and
loss of the goods.
278. 256 N.W.2d 336 (N.D. 1977).
279. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-01 through 09-53 (1968).
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Code, 280 the general provisions article of the Uniform Commercial
Code 28 1 was applicable. 2 2 Furthermore the statutory non-Uniform
Commercial Code parol evidence rule -2 83 was applicable with regard to
the subordination agreement and rider as a supplementary general
principle of law. 28
4
The Peoples Bank 'and Trust had a security interest in the inven-
tory and accounts receivable of defendant Reiff and instituted this
action against Reiff and another creditor which also had a security
,interest in the inventory and accounts receivable, to obtain 'a deter-
mination of priorities. 2 5 The supreme court reversed the Mountrail
County District Court ruling which had entered a judgment determin-
ing that the second creditor, by the execution of a rider to a subordi-
nation agreement, waived its priority against Reiff for any money due
in excess of $15,000.21 6 The rider, which was at the crux of this dis-
pute, provided that provisions of the subordination agreement should
only apply to that portion of the superior indebtedness up to and in-
cluding the first $15,000 thereof, and that priority of the remainder of
the superior indebtedness should be determined in accordance with
the provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 28 7 The
court found this provision inconsistent with parol evidence that the
bank intended that there be a $15,000 limit on the subordination agree-
ment, but held the parol evidence inadmissible 28 under the non-Uni-
form Commercial Code parol evidence rule. The case was remanded
for a redetermination of creditor priorities. 28 9
In a special concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Peterson expressed
the view that North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a) mandated
reversal. His conclusion rested upon the premise that the conclusions
of law by the trial court were not supported, or at least were not so
set forth, by the findings of fact.2 90
Mr. Justice Vogel, in a dissenting opinion, insisted that the case
should have been governed solely by Uniform Commercial Code prin-
ciples. He reasoned that because the Uniform Commercial Code may
be applied to transactions which are analogous to sales although tech-
nically not sales, the non-Uniform Commercial Code parol evidence
rule291 is inapplicable and the opinion of the district court was cor-
rect.2
92
280. Id. § 41-09-37 (1968).
281. Id. ch. 41-01 (1968).
282. Peoples Bank & Trust v. Reiff, 256 N.W.2d 336, 340 (N.D. 1977).
283. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-07 (1968).
284. 256 N.W.2d at 340.
285. Id. at 337-40.
2S6. Id. at 339.
287. Id. at 338.
288. Id. at 342.
289. 256 N.W.2d at 345-46.
290. 256 N.W.2d at .346.
291. N.D. CENT. CODE 9-06-07 (1968).
292. 256 N.W.2d at 346.
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In Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Electric, Inc., 293 the question of the
'applicability of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to mixed
"goods" and "service" contracts came before the North Dakota Su-
preme Court for the first time. The case was 'an appeal by Johnson
Electric, Inc. from a judgment of the Williams County District Court
in which that court awarded damages to Air Heater's, Inc. on the ba-
sis that Johnson Electric breached an implied warranty in the installa-
tion of an electrical system in a building owned by Air Heaters.2 14
Air Heaters suit was premised on negligence, breach of express war-
ranty, breach of implied warranty for ordinary purposes, and strict
liability in tort for its design, construction, installation and mainte-
nance of the electrical distribution system. 295
In resolving the question of whether the contract for the design
and installation of the electrical system by Johnson Electric was cov-
ered by the implied warranties of the Uniform Commercial Code, 296
the court expressly adopted the Bonebrake test 297 espoused by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 29  With the adoption of the Bonebrake
test, it becomes necessary in mixed goods and service contracts, to
determine whether their predominant factor is the rendition of
service, with goods incidentally involved, or is a transaction of sale,
with labor incidentally involved. 299 The Court concluded that the rec-
ord in this instance did not include enough factual data concerning
this particular contract to make that determination. 00
Continuing, Mr. Chief Justice Erickstad, speaking for a unani-
mous Court, pointed out the fact that the implied warranties under the
Uniform Commercial Code 30' are not the only implied warranties cov-
ering construction contracts.30 2 In its 1973 term, the North Dakota
Supreme Court, in Dobler v. Malloy,303 adopted the rule that the doc-
trine of implied warranty of fitness can apply to construction con-
tracts when certain conditions are met. 30 4 Because the four conditions
293. 258 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1977).
294. Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Electric, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649, 650 (N.D. 1977).
295. Id. at 651.
296. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-31, 32 (1968).
297. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974).
298. Id. at 960.
299. 258 N. ,V.2d at 652.
900. Id.
301. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 41-02-31, 32 (1968).
302. 258 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1977).
303. 214 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1973).
304. Dobler v. Malloy, 214 N.WV.2d 510 (ND. 1973). In Dobler, the court said,:
Although the precise matter has not been before this court previously, we
adopt the holding . . . that the doctrine of implied warranty of fitness for
the purpose applies to construction contracts under circumstances where
(1) the contractor holds himself oiit, expressly or by implication, as com-
petent to undertake the contract; and the owner (2) has no particular exper-
tise in the kind of work contemplated; (3) furnishes no plans, designs,
specifications, details, or blueprints; and (4) tacitly or specifically indicates
his reliance on the ex, erience and skill of the contractor, after making known
to him the specific purposes for iNhich the building is intended.
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of Dobler 0 5 were held to have been met, the trial court's finding that
the fire was caused by a defect in the electrical system was upheld20 6
Mott Grain Company v. First National Bank & Trust Company of
Bismarck307 involved an appeal by the First National Bank and Trust
Company of Bismarck from a Hettinger County District Court judg-
ment holding it liable for the face amount of 17 checks, totaling $40,-
520.93, which were the property of Mott Grain Company. The grain
company was a depositor in the bank and the payee on the checks
which had been wrongfully endorsed by its manager and deposited in
his personal 'account.308 The bank argued on appeal that a corporate
authorization 3 9 gave it authority to handle checks endorsed by the
grain company manager, that the manager was therefore clothed with
apparent or ostensible authority to present checks to the bank, and
that the negligence of the Mott Grain Company precluded it from re-
covery.310 The case was governed3 11 by the Uniform Commercial
Code.3 12
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the language in the
corporate authorization did not cover the funds in question because the
bank did not treat them as funds of the corporation, but rather as
funds of the individual.3 1-3
The bank's argument that the grain company's negligence consti-
tuted a defense 314 was also rejected because the bank did not meet the
requirements 15 to qualify as a holder in due course.31 6 The grain com-
pany manager was depositing third-party checks payable to the grain
company in his personal account and thus "for his own benefit." The
bank therefore, did not acquire the instruments without notice and
was subject to the claims and defenses of the grain company.3 17
Id., citing Robertson Lumber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Cooperative Elevator, 274 Minn. 17,
143 N.VW.2- 622 (1966).
305. 214 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1973).
306. 258 N.V.2d at 656-57.
307. 259 N.W.2d 667 (N.D. 1977).
308. Mott Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Bismarck, 259 N.W.2d 667, 668
(N.D. 1977).
309. A "Corporate Authorization Resolution" signed by both parties herein stated, in
pertinent part, as follows:
That checks, drafts and other withdrawal orders and any and all other di-
rections and instructions of any character witlh respect to funds of this cor-
poration now or hereafter with said Bank may be signed by any one of the
[three officers] and said Bank is hereby fully authorized to pay anI charge
to such account or accounts anv checks, drafts and other withdrawal orders
so signed, and to honor any directions or instructions so signed, whether or
not payable to the individual order of or deposited to the individual account
of or inuring to the individual benefit of any of the foregoing officers or
persons.
Id. at 668-69.
310. Id. at 669.
311. Id.
812. N.D. CE NT. Conp ch. 41-01 (1968) : Id. ch. 41-03 (1968).
31.3. 259 N.V.2d at 670.
314. N.D. CENT. CoDo § 41-03-43 (196,0)
315. Id. § 41-03-32 (1969q).
316. 259 N.W".2d at 670.
317. Id.
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WILLS AND TRUSTS
Since the North Dakota Legislature's adoption of the Uniform
Probate Code,3 18 the court has had a significant body of law to inter-
pret. This year the court resolved questions concerning the problems
of non-concurring co-representatives and appellate procedure.
The appellant in Conway v. Parker3 1 9 was a co-representative with
her sister, the appellee, of their parents' estates.32 0 The appellee peti-
tioned to and was granted by the probate court a request that a power
of attorney be given to a specific accounting firm to represent the
estates before the Internal Revenue Service and to obtain any exten-
sions of time necessary to file the proper tax returns. 321 The appellant
claimed she was compelled to execute a power of attorney, an act she
did not wish to perform.32 2 Underlying this claim is Uniform Probate
Code Section 3-717323 which provides that in the situation of co-repre-
sentatives, unless the will provides otherwise, "the concurrence of all
is required on all acts connected with the administration and distribu-
tion of the estate. ' 3 2
4
The court relied on a personal representative's duty to settle and
distribute an estate "as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent
with the best interests of the estate,"3 2 5 to resolve the conflict between
the Code's goal of joint action and the stalemate that had developed
in the administration of the estates. As the possibility of late filing
penalties, which would ultimately be paid from the estate, could be
avoided by granting the power of attorney to the accounting firm, the
failure of the co-representatives to agree could not prevail and
threaten the best interests of the estate.3 26
Once a duty existed, the Court upheld the probate court's author-
ity to order the execution of the power of attorney. Uniform Probate
Code Section 3-607327 provides as follows:
1. On petition of any person who appears to have an interest
in the estate, the court . . . may . . . make any other order to
secure proper performance of his [personal representative's]
duty, if it appears to the court that the personal representa-
tive otherwise may take some action which would jeopardize
318. 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 257 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 30.1).
319. 250 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1977).
320. Conway v. Parker, 250 N.W.2d 266, 270 (N.D. 1977).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 271. The reason the appellee had sought the court order was In part because
the estate had been threatened earlier with a substantial late filing penalty for filing late
one of the tax returns. By delegating the tax preparation to the accounting firm, the
appellee was attempting to ensure that all tax returns were properly filed. Id.
323. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-18-17 (1976).
324. Id.
325. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-18-03(1) (1976).
326. 250 N.W.2d at 272.
327. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-17-07 (1976).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
unreasonably the interest of the applicant or of some other in-
terested person.3
28
The court cleverly overlooked the words "may take some action
which would jeopardize . . . the interest of the applicant ... ."3 19in its
reading of the statute. 3 0 This case did not involve "action" which
would jeopardize the interests of someone; rather, the appellant's "in-
action," that is, the failure to concur with the grant of a power of at-
tcrney to the accounting firm, was the alleged threat to the appellee's
interest. Rather than ignoring the words and rendering its decision
questionable, the court could have construed the words in such a way
as to bring about the same result. The entire purpose behind the sta-
tute seems to be to allow the courts some control over the personal
representative's administration of an estate. An applicant's interest
in the estate can be jeopardized as easily by a personal representa-
tive's failure to act as by her acts. By recognizing this, the court
could have developed a policy of control that would encourage per-
sonal representatives to act in accordance with their duties to admin-
ister estates.
The Conway approach should not always be followed, particularly
in the case of co-representatives. If not limited, this approach could
develop into a "race to the court" by the representative thinking his
method of administration to be the better. Courts should be certain
that a duty exists and that the circumstances do not permit a joint de-
cision. One of those circumstances should be the good faith of the pe-
titioning co-representative. A court should not exercise its authority
to order a co-representative to act properly for the best interests of
the estate when the petitioning co-representative has not himself acted
with good faith in attempting to negotiate a joint decision with the
other.
The appellate procedure question was considered in In re Estate
of Bieber.331 The question involved a district court's jurisdiction of an
'appeal from county court. Specifically, was service of the notice of ap-
peal upon the attorney of the personal representative alone sufficient
to give the district court jurisdiction over the appeal? 3 2 The court
held it was not, as North Dakota law requires service upon not only
the personal representative, but also on all other parties to the pro-
bate proceeding before the county court . 333
The legislature's adoption of the Uniform Probate Code did not
include Section 1-308 providing for appellate procedure. Instead the
328. Id.
329. Id. (emphasis added).
330. 250 N.W.2d at 272.
331. 256 N.A%.2d R79 (N.D. 1977).
332. In re Estate of Bieber, 256 N.V.2d S79, 88o (N.D. 1977).
333. Id.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
legislature provided that district courts have appellate jurisdiction as
provided in Chapter 30-26 of the North Dakota Century Code.3 34 Ap-
pellate review is also governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, 3 5
one of which is Rule 81 (b) providing that the "rules do not supersede
the provisions of statutes relating to appeals to or review by the dis-
trict courts, but shall govern procedure and practice relating thereto
insofar as these rules are not inconsistent with such statutes. '3 6 This
inconsistency was resolved by the Court's declaration that the Rules
of Civil Procedure apply insofar as they are not contrary to the
Code. 83 7
North Dakota law requires each person who was a party to the
county court proceeding to be made a party to the appeal s38 and the
appellant to have the notice of appeal served on each of the parties. 339
Chapter 30-26 of the Code does not, however, specify the manner of
service of the notice of appeal. 340 At this point, the transition is made
from the Code to the Rules of Civil Procedure. The requirements are
found in Rule 5.341
Undoubtedly the most important feature of this decision as it re-
lates to an attorney's practice is that appeals in probate matters from
county courts are different from appeals generally.3 42 In probate mat-
ters all parties must be served by the appellant. 34 3 In other appeals
the appellant need only serve the clerk of the trial court.3 4 4 The clerk
then has the responsibility of serving notice on the other parties.3 4 5
334. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-02-02(2) (1976).
335. N.D.R. Civ. P. 81(b).
336. Id.
337. 256 N.VW.2d at 881.
338. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-26-02 (1976).
339. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-26-03 (1976).
340. In re Ashbrook's Estate, 110 N.V.2d 14, 188 (N.D. 1961). The manner of service
was outlined in N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 30-02. Those provisions were repealed when the Uni-
form Probate Code was adopted. 1973 N.D. Seas. Laws ch. 257.
341. N.D.R. Civ. P. 5.
342. 256 N.WV.2d at 882.
343. N.D. CENT. CODE ; 30-26-02 (1976)
344. N.D.R. APP. P. 3.
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